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THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF DATA PRIVACY AND 






The regulation of data privacy and cyber security in the financial services 
sector is in its infancy. This is partly due to the fact that the regulation of 
financial services is fragmented with multiple regulators covering varying 
risks, across different entities, serving a variety customers. These regulators 
include the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the “Federal Reserve” or 
“The Fed”), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (“FinCEN”), among others, as well as additional state agencies 
covering traditional commercial banking, consumer lending, investment 
banking, and broker dealer activity. This article will review the standards that 
are currently being utilized by both the prudential regulators, the CFPB, as 
well as the New York Department of Financial Services, and the best practices 
that those in the commercial banking and consumer lending spaces should 
implement including review of the FFIEC’s Cyber Security tool. This article 
will also address the same expectations in the regulation of the securities and 
investment space, with a discussion of examination trends and an overview of 
recent enforcement actions. Finally, following this article’s discussion of 
compliance on the front end, it will conclude with best practices to implement 
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in the event of a breach, and how implementing best practices prior to a breach 
will help in limiting regulatory, reputational, and litigation liability following a 
breach. 
I. REGULATION PRIORITIES OF THE FFIEC 
Within commercial banking data privacy and cybersecurity pose a risk to 
both an institution’s consumers as well as the institution’s safety and 
soundness. Given this fact, the CFPB, FDIC, The Fed and the OCC all have 
interests in promoting metrics, controls and standards to enhance the protection 
of information. 
The Comptroller at the OCC has repeatedly highlighted the risk of cyber 
threats to financial institutions, going as far to call cyber threats the foremost 
risk facing banks today1 while the FDIC has said Information Security is 
critical to their ability to carry out its mission of maintaining stability and 
public confidence in the nation’s financial system.2 
The FFIEC is a formal interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform 
principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial 
institutions by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and to make 
recommendations to promote uniformity in the supervision of financial 
institutions.3 To this end they publish various resources to focus on. The 
FFIEC Information Security booklet is one of these resources. The booklet is 
part of many that comprise the FFIEC’s “IT handbook”. There are eleven (11) 
such booklets—booklets covering a variety of issues including: Audit 
functions, Business Continuity planning, Development and Acquisition, E-
banking, Outsourcing technologies as well as other topics. However, the 
Information Security booklet speaks directly to the process by which a 
financial institution protects sensitive information.  
Special focus should be paid to the updated Appendix A which was 
published as guidance for a regulator’s field examiners to assess the level of 
 
 1 Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before the New England Council, Boston 
Massachusetts (Jul. 24, 2015) (transcript available from the Office of the Comptroller of the Curency). 
 2 FDIC, FDIC CYBERSECURITY, https://www.fdic.gov/about/governance/cybersecurity.html (last 
updated February 22, 2017). 
 3 FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/, (last modified Aug. 3, 2016).  
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security risks to an institution’s information systems and the adequacy of its 
information security program’s integration into overall risk management. The 
following 11 objectives are listed for said examiners within the appendix, but 
objectives 2-10 can be used as internal guidance to assess an institution’s 
program:4 
(1) Determine the appropriate scope and objectives for the 
examination. 
(2) Determine whether management promotes effective 
governance of the information security program through a 
strong information security culture, defined information 
security responsibilities and accountability, and adequate 
resources to support the program. 
(3) Determine whether management of the information security 
program is appropriate and supports the institution’s ITRM 
process, integrates with lines of business and support 
functions, and integrates third-party service provider activities 
with the information security program. 
(4) As part of the information security program, determine 
whether management has established risk identification 
processes. 
(5) Determine whether management measures the risk to guide its 
recommendations for and use of mitigating controls. 
(6) Determine whether management effectively implements 
controls to mitigate identified risk. 
(7) Determine whether management has effective risk monitoring 
and reporting processes. 
(8) Determine whether management has security operations that 
encompass necessary security-related functions, are guided by 
defined processes, are integrated with lines of business and 
activities outsourced to third-party service providers, and have 
adequate resources (e.g., staff and technology). 
(9) Determine whether management has an effective information 
security program. 
(10) Determine whether assurance activities provide sufficient 
confidence that the security program is operating as expected 
and reaching intended goals. 
(11) Discuss corrective action and communicate findings. 
In an effort to help institutions’ management identify their risks and 
determine their preparedness, in 2015 the FFIEC released what is known as the 
 
 4 FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EXAMINATION 
HANDBOOK, INFORMATION SECURITY, 1 57–74 (2016). 
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‘Cyber Security Basement Tool’ which is comprised of a set of definable 
metrics that can provide a baseline as to where an institution sits. The 
assessment tool was designed to provide a measurable and repeatable process 
to assess an institution’s level of cybersecurity risk and preparedness.5 It 
consist of two parts: 
(1) Inherent Risk Profile 
(2) Cybersecurity Maturity 
To define an Inherent Risk Profile, an institution must incorporate the type, 
volume and complexity of their operations and threats directed at the 
institution without including any mitigating controls. From this, an institution 
is able to assign one of five risk levels (Least, Minimal, moderate, Significant, 
Most) to five different categories:6 
• Technologies and connection types 
• Delivery channels 
• Online/mobile products and technology services 
• Organizational characteristics 
• External threats 
After determining the Inherent Risk Profile, the institution transitions to the 
Cybersecurity Maturity part of the Assessment to determine the institution’s 
maturity level within each of the following five domains7: 
• Domain 1: Cyber Risk Management and Oversight 
• Domain 2: Threat Intelligence and Collaboration 
• Domain 3: Cybersecurity Controls 
• Domain 4: External Dependency Management 
• Domain 5: Cyber Incident Management and Resilience 
There are narratives which describe the controls within each of these 
domains that would place an organization in one of five statuses (Baseline, 
Evolving, Intermediate, Advanced or Innovative). Once completed, one can 
review an institution’s Inherent Risk Profile in relation to its Cybersecurity 
Maturity results for each domain to determine whether they are aligned. If they 
 
 5 FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL, USER’S GUIDE, 
1, 1 (2015). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 5. 
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are not aligned, an institution can then decide what actions are needed either to 
affect the inherent risk profile or to achieve a desired state of maturity. 
An institution is not currently required to utilize the Cyber Security tool 
and, if it does utilize it, it is not required to report the results. However as with 
any self-assessment, if an institution does utilize it, it must provide the results 
if asked by its primary regulator. The use of this tool cannot only limit 
regulatory liability by showcasing that an institution is doing all that it can to 
implement a sound approach to data privacy and cyber security, but it also may 
have the effects of limiting litigation liability in the event of breach, as the 
institution will be able to show that it was prudent in its data privacy and 
cybersecurity practices which can limit damages in a lot of cases. 
II. THE CFPB EFFORTS TO REGULATE THROUGH ENFORCEMENT 
The CFPB began their regulation of the data protection space with an 
enforcement action. In a press release announcing the action, the CFPB cited 
its authority under UDAAP to bring a claim against an entity called Dwolla, 
Inc., explaining, “rather than setting ‘a new precedent for the payments 
industry’ as asserted, Dwolla’s data security practices in fact fell far short of its 
claims. Such deception about security and security practices is illegal.”8 Under 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank 
Act), all covered persons or service providers are legally required to refrain 
from committing unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (collectively, 
UDAAPs) in violation of the Act.9 An act or practice is deceptive when: 
(1) The act or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the 
consumer; 
(2) The consumer’s interpretation is reasonable under the 
circumstances; and 
(3) The misleading act or practice is material.10 
One would think that it was the statements that were illegal, not the 
practices, but when you review the consent order it becomes readily apparent 
the CFPB was focused on Dwolla’s policies and procedures—not their 
marketing material. 
 
 8 Press Release, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla for 
Misrepresenting Data Security Practices (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-dwolla-for-misrepresenting-data-security-practices/. 
 9 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Bull. 2013–07, Prohibition of Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts 
or Practices in the Collection of Consumer Debts (2013). 
 10 Id. at 3 (citing CFPB Exam Manual at UDAAP 5). 
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The consent order addresses the marketing violations by mentioning that 
Dwolla is enjoined from “misrepresenting, or assisting others in 
misrepresenting, expressly or by implication, the data-security practices 
implemented”. The Bureau then quickly moves to a lengthy discussion on how 
Dwolla must change their data protection procedures. The order fined Dwolla 
only $100,000, but required the company to: 
(1) Adopt and implement reasonable and appropriate data-security 
measures to protect consumers’ personal information; 
(2) Establish, implement and maintain a written, comprehensive 
data security plan that is reasonably designed to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive consumer 
information; 
(3) Adopt and implement reasonable and appropriate data-security 
policies and procedures; 
(4) Designate a qualified person to coordinate and be accountable 
for the data-security program; 
(5) Conduct data-security risk assessments twice annually and 
evaluate and adjust the data security program as needed; 
(6) Conduct regular, mandatory employee training; 
(7) Develop, implement and update, as required, security patches 
to fix any security vulnerabilities identified in any web or 
mobile application; and 
(8) Develop, implement and maintain an appropriate method of 
customer identity authentication. 
This has been the CFPB’s only attempt to regualte a covered entity on a 
data priavcy issue, infact prior to this enforcement action, most of the industry 
belived data privacy issues to be handled by the FTC or the prudential 
reguators and the fine levied was small in proportions to the enforcement 
actions the CFPB levies against the industry. One has to wonder what might 
happen if the Bureau tries this on a larger scale, attempting to levy a fine in the 
millions—will an institution challenge the CFPB’s authority in the space? And 
is this order the CFPB’s attempt to position itself as a primary authority on 
data protection and cybersecurity? 
III. THE NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES’ CYBERSECURITY 
RULE 
States have begun to regulate the data privacy and cybersecurity practices 
of the financial services industry as well. The New York Department of 
Financial Services (NYDFS) released the self-proclaimed “first in the nation” 
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rule entitled “Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies” 
to require effective cybersecurity measures to protect consumers and ensure 
the safe and sound operation of Department-regulated entities. The proposed 
rule has since been revised and the final rule became effective on March 1, 
2017.11 
The final rule was narrowed in scope from the proposed rule, but still 
creates cause for concern in multiple areas. In part the rule covers: 
(1) A very broad definition of “covered entity”—which includes 
“any Person operating under or required to operate under a 
license, registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation 
or similar authorization under the Banking Law, the Insurance 
Law or the Financial Services Law”.12 
(2) Unconventional definition of nonpublic information—it is 
very broad and states that the term, “shall mean all electronic 
information that is not Publicly Available Information” and is: 
(A) Business related information of a Covered Entity the 
tampering with which, or unauthorized disclosure, 
access or use of which, would cause a material adverse 
impact to the business, operations or security of the 
Covered Entity;13 
(B) Any information concerning an individual which 
because of name, number, personal mark, or other 
identifier can be used to identify such individual, in 
combination with any one or more of the following data 
elements: (i) social security number, (ii) drivers’ license 
number or non-driver identification card number, (iii) 
account number, credit or debit card number, (iv) any 
security code, access code or password that would 
permit access to an individual’s financial account, or (v) 
biometric records;14 
(C) Any information or data, except age or gender, in any 
form or medium created by or derived from a health 
care provider or an individual and that relates to (i) the 
past, present or future physical, mental or behavioral 
health or condition of any individual or a member of the 
individual’s family, (ii) the provision of health care to 
 
 11 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.00 (2017).  
 12 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.01(c) (2017). 
 13 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.01(g)(1) (2017).  
 14 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.01(g)(2) (2017).  
NAZARROWHITESETTERLUND GALLEYFINAL 5/4/2017 4:00 PM 
376 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 4 
any individual, or (iii) payment for the provision of 
health care to any individual.15 
(3) Strict audit trail requirements.16 
(4) A mandate for a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)—
which can include a “qualified individual” to serve as CISO 
for the entity and may either be a company employee or an 
external vendor.17 
(5) Annual certifications18 
IV. REGULATION IN THE SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT SECTOR 
Financial industry regulators have identified cybersecurity as one of the 
most significant risks that brokerage and investment advisory firms face.19 
Accordingly, regulators in this sector will continue to focus on firms’ 
supervision and risk management related to cybersecurity, technology 
management, and data quality and governance. As discussed below, these areas 
have been identified as key issues by both the SEC and FINRA. 
A. The SEC’s Focus on Cybersecurity 
The SEC annually issues guidance concerning its regulatory priorities for 
the coming year. This year, the SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (“OCIE”) issued its Examination Priorities for 2017 on January 
12, 2017.20 Among its identified examination priorities is cybersecurity.21 This 
is not surprising as the OCIE has included cybersecurity as a priority since 
2014. 
In regulating cybersecurity and data protection issues, the SEC has a 
variety of regulatory tools at its disposal. These tools include Reg SCI 
 
 15 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.01(g)(3) (2017).  
 16 See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.06 (2017).  
 17 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.04 (2017).  
 18 See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.17 (2017).  
 19 See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Christopher Hetner as Senior Advisor to 
the Chair for Cybersecurity Policy (June 2, 2016) (quoting SEC Chair Mary Jo White stating “Cyber attacks 
are a constant threat to our markets[.] . . . With the cyber field steadily evolving and expanding, it is imperative 
we continue to enhance our coordinated approach to cybersecurity policy across the SEC and engage at the 
highest levels with market participants and governmental bodies concerning the latest developments in this 
area.”). 
 20 Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Examination Priorities for 
2017 (2017). 
 21 Id. at 4 (“Cybersecurity. In 2017, we will continue our initiative to examine for cybersecurity 
compliance procedures and controls, including testing the implementation of those procedures and controls.”). 
NAZARROWHITESETTERLUND GALLEYFINAL 5/4/2017 4:00 PM 
2017] DATA PRIVACY AND CYBER SECURITY 377 
(Systems, Compliance and Integrity);22 Reg S-P (Safeguards for the Protection 
of Customer Records and Information);23 Reg SDR (Security-Based Swap 
Data Repository);24 Reg S-ID (Identity Theft Red Flags);25 Exchange Act Rule 
15c3-5 (Market Access);26 and Investment Company Act Rule 38-1 and 
Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7 (Compliance Rules).27 These 
regulations provide the SEC with wide latitude in requiring companies to enact 
adequate policies, procedures, and practices related to cybersecurity and data 
compliance. 
As noted above, regulation of cybersecurity in the financial services sector 
generally is relatively new. The SEC’s regulation of these issues is no 
exception. The SEC’s principle regulatory efforts in this arena began in March 
2014, when the SEC sponsored a Cybersecurity Roundtable.28 Thereafter, in 
April 2014, the OCIE announced the implementation of its Cybersecurity 
Initiative.29 The initiative would undertake to examine more than 50 registered 
broker-dealers and registered investment advisers on each entity’s 
cybersecurity governance, identification and assessment of cybersecurity risks, 
protection of networks and information, risks associated with remote customer 
access and funds transfer requests, risks associated with vendors and other 
third parties, detection of unauthorized activity, and experiences with certain 
cybersecurity threats.30 
In February 2015, the OCIE announced the results of this initiative.31 This 
announcement revealed that the OCIE examined 57 registered broker-dealers 
and 49 registered investment advisers to better understand how firms address 
 
 22 17 CFR Parts 240, 242, and 249. 
 23 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2017).  
 24 17 C.F.R. §§ 232, 240, 249 (2017). 
 25 17 C.F.R. 248 (2017). 
 26 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3–5 (2017). 
 27 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.38a1, 275.206(4)–7 (2017). 
 28 See Press Release, Mary Jo White, Chair, Opening Statement at SEC Roundtable on Cybersecurity 
(Mar. 26, 2014) (underscoring the importance of technology, including cybersecurity preparedness to the 
integrity of the market system and customer data protection.), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/ 
PublicStmt/1370541286468; see also Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, The Commission’s Role 
in Addressing the Growing Cyber-Threat, (Mar. 26, 2014) (emphasizing the importance for the SEC to gather 
information and consider what additional steps it should take to address cyber-threats.),: 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541287184.  
 29 See Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, National Exam 
Program Risk Alert Vol. IV, Issue 2, OCIE Cybersecurity Initiative (2014).  
 30 Id. at 2. 
 31 Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, National Exam Program, 
Risk Alert Vol. IV, Issue 4, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary (2015). 
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the legal, regulatory and compliance issues associated with cybersecurity.32 In 
the examinations, the staff collected and analyzed information from the 
selected firms relating to their practices for: identifying risks related to 
cybersecurity; establishing cybersecurity governance, including policies, 
procedures, and oversight processes; protecting firm networks and information; 
identifying and addressing risks associated with remote access to client 
information and funds transfer requests; identifying and addressing risks 
associated with vendors and other third parties; and detecting unauthorized 
activity. In addition to reviewing documents, the staff held interviews with key 
personnel at each firm regarding its: business and operations; detection and 
impact of cyber-attacks; preparedness for cyber-attacks; training and policies 
relevant to cybersecurity; and protocol for reporting cyber breaches.33 The 
OCIE survey found that 88 percent of broker-dealers and 74 percent of 
advisers have experienced cyber attacks, either directly or through a vendor.34 
Moreover, 54 percent of broker dealers and 43 percent of advisers reported 
receiving fraudulent emails seeking to transfer client funds, and several of 
these reported losses relating to the fraudulent emails.35 The announcement 
also contained observations focusing on how firms identify cybersecurity risks; 
establish cybersecurity policies, procedures and oversight processes; protect 
their networks and information; and detect unauthorized activity.36 
Following up on its February alert, the OCIE issued another risk alert on 
cybersecurity in September 2015.37 This alert announced that the OCIE would 
be conducting a second round of cybersecurity exams, which would involve 
more testing to assess the implementation of firm procedures and controls and 
further assess cybersecurity preparedness in the securities industry, including 
firms’ ability to protect broker-dealer customer and investment adviser client 
information.38 The second round exams would focus on: (1) Governance and 
risk assessment; (2) Access rights and controls; (3) Data loss prevention; (4) 
Vendor management; (5) Training; and (6) Incident response.39 The OCIE has 
continued to conduct examinations of broker-dealers and investment advisers 
 
 32 Id. at 1. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 2. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 2–5. 
 37 Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, National Exam Program, 
Risk Alert Vol. IV, Issue 4, OCIE’s 2015 Cybersecurity Examination Initiative (2015).  
 38 Id. at 2–3. 
 39 Id. 
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in these areas since that time, and its 2017 Examination Priorities Letter 
indicates these examinations will continue throughout 2017.40 
B. FINRA’s Focus on Cybersecurity 
Similar to the OCIE, FINRA annually issues guidance concerning its 
regulatory and examination priorities for the coming year. This year, FINRA 
issued its Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter for 2017 on January 4, 
2017.41 Among its identified examination priorities is cybersecurity.42 While 
the SEC has included cybersecurity as an annual priority since 2014, 
cybersecurity has been a regular theme in FINRA’s annual Regulatory and 
Examination Priorities Letters since 2007. 
Much of FINRA’s regulatory authority over cybersecurity and data 
privacy-related matters is the same as that of the SEC. However, FINRA’s 
regulatory actions to date demonstrate that it primarily reviews compliance 
with Regulation S-P,43 which requires firms to adopt written policies and 
procedures to protect customer information against cyber attacks and other 
forms of unauthorized access; Regulation S-ID,44 which outlines a firm’s 
duties regarding the detection, prevention and mitigation of identity theft; and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,45 which requires firms to preserve 
electronically stored records in a non-rewriteable, non-erasable format. 
FINRA’s regulation over these issues began much like the SEC’s, with 
surveys and reviews of firm practices related to cybersecurity and data privacy. 
 
 40 See supra note 2. 
 41 Fin. Industry Reg. Authority, 2017 Annual Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter (2017).  
 42 Id. at 6 (“Cybersecurity threats remain one of the most significant risks many firms face, and in 2017, 
FINRA will continue to assess firms’ programs to mitigate those risks. FINRA recognizes there is no one-size-
fits-all approach to cybersecurity, and we will tailor our assessment of cybersecurity programs to each firm 
based on a variety of factors, including its business model, size and risk profile. Among the areas FINRA may 
review are firms’ methods for preventing data loss, including understanding their data (e.g., its degree of 
sensitivity and the locations where it is stored), and its flow through the firm, and possibly to vendors. FINRA 
may assess controls firms use to monitor and protect this data, for example, through data loss prevention tools. 
In some instances, we will review how firms manage their vendor relationships, including the controls to 
manage those relationships. The controls should be informed by a number of factors, including a clear 
understanding of any customer or employee personally identifiable information or sensitive firm information 
to which vendors have access. We may also examine firms’ controls to protect sensitive information from 
insider threats. The nature of the insider threat itself is rapidly changing as the workforce evolves to include 
more employees who are mobile, trusted external partnerships and vendors, internal and external contractors, 
as well as offshore resources.”). 
 43 17 CFR §248.30. 
 44 17 CFR §§248.201–202. 
 45 17 CFR §240.17a-4(f). 
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In 2010 and 2011, FINRA conducted on-site reviews of firms of varying sizes 
and business models to assess how firms control critical information 
technology and cyber risks.46 In June 2011, FINRA conducted a survey of 224 
firms to better understand industry information technology and cybersecurity 
practices and issues that may impact investor protection or market integrity.47 
Then, in 2014, FINRA launched a targeted sweep to explore cybersecurity. 
FINRA expressed four primary objectives: (1) to better understand the types of 
threats that firms face; (2) to increase its understanding of firms’ risk appetite, 
exposure and major areas of vulnerabilities in their information technology 
systems; (3) to better understand firms’ approaches to managing these threats; 
and (4) to share observations and findings with firms.48 
In February 2015, FINRA issued its report on cybersecurity practices, 
which detailed the results of its survey and sweep, and provides what FINRA 
believes to be principles and effective practices for firms to consider in 
developing cybersecurity programs.49 The report focused on best practices and 
considerations regarding several key areas, including: cybersecurity 
governance and risk management; cybersecurity risk assessment; technical 
controls; incident response planning; vendor management; staff training; cyber 
intelligence and information sharing; and cyber insurance.50 FINRA’s report 
concluded that the top three threats in these areas identified in its 2011 survey 
and 2014 sweep were: hackers penetrating systems; insiders compromising 
firm or client data; and operational risks.51 Accordingly, FINRA’s report 
intended to present an approach to cybersecurity to combat these risks that was 
grounded in risk management principles.52 FINRA noted, however, that while 
the principals and practices addressed in the report should be considered by all 
firms, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity.53 
 
 46 See FINRA, Report on Cybersecurity Practices (2017).  
 47 Id. at 1. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 4. 
 52 Id. at 1. 
 53 To further assist small firms in establishing cybersecurity programs designed to identify, assess and 
detect cybersecurity threats; protect assets from cyber intrusions; and plan for a response when a compromise 
occurs, FINRA launched its Small Firm Cybersecurity Checklist in 2015. See FINRA, Checlist for a Small 
Firm’s Cybersecurity Program (2016).  
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C. Exemplar Regulatory Actions 
In addition to other regulators discussed throughout this article, the SEC 
and FINRA have brought numerous actions against firms they believe have 
violated rules and regulations related to cybersecurity and data privacy. 
Discussed below are actions in several areas where FINRA and the SEC have 
been particularly focused. 
1. Violations Resulting from a Cyber-Breach 
One June 8, 2016, the SEC fined a firm $1 million for allegedly failing to 
protect customer information, some of which was likely hacked and offered for 
sale online.54 The misappropriated data included personally identifiable 
information (“PII”), such as customers’ full names, phone numbers, street 
addresses, account numbers, account balances and securities holdings.55 The 
SEC alleged that the firm used web “portals” for employees to access customer 
information without effective authorization modules to restrict access solely to 
employees with legitimate business needs, and that it failed to audit or test the 
relevant authorization modules.56 Factually, the SEC alleged that from 2011 to 
2014, a then-employee impermissibly accessed and transferred data regarding 
approximately 730,000 accounts to his personal server, which was ultimately 
hacked by third parties.57 Following the hack of the personal server, the SEC 
alleged that it was likely that portions of the confidential data were posted on 
the Internet along with offers to sell larger quantities.58 As a result of this 
conduct, the firm was alleged to have violated Rule 30(a) of Reg. S-P, the 
“Safeguards Rule” which requires, among others, every broker-dealer and 
investment adviser registered with the Commission to adopt written policies 
and procedures reasonably designed to: (1) insure the security and 
confidentiality of customer records and information; (2) protect against any 
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of customer records 
and information; and (3) protect against unauthorized access to or use of 
customer records or information that could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer. Announcing the settlement of the charges, the 
SEC’s Director of its Enforcement Division stated that “[g]iven the dangers 
 
 54 Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, 2016 SEC LEXIS 2142 (ALJ 
June 8, 2016) (cease-and-desist order).  
 55 Id. at 2. 
 56 Id. at 2–3. 
 57 Id. at 5. 
 58 Id. at 2. 
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and impact of cyber breaches, data security is a critically important aspect of 
investor protection. We expect SEC registrants of all sizes to have policies and 
procedures that are reasonably designed to protect customer information[.]”59 
The former-employee separately agreed to an industry and penny stock bar 
with the right to apply for reentry after five years, and was criminally 
convicted for his actions and received 36 months of probation and a $600,000 
restitution order as a result of his conduct.60 
2. Failing to Establish Adequate Policies and Procedures 
On September 22, 2015, the SEC settled with a firm for $75,000 for 
allegedly failing to establish adequate cybersecurity policies and procedures in 
advance of a breach that made PII of approximately 100,000 individuals, 
including thousands of the firm’s clients, vulnerable to theft.61 The firm’s web 
server was alleged to have been attacked in July 2013 by an unknown hacker 
who gained access and copy rights to the data on its server, rendering the PII 
vulnerable to theft.62 The SEC alleged that the firm failed to adopt written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to safeguard customer 
information in violation of Rule 30(a) of Reg. S-P.63 For example, the SEC 
alleged the firm failed to conduct periodic risk assessments, implement a 
firewall, encrypt PII stored on its server or maintain a response plan for 
cybersecurity incidents.64 Notably, there were no allegations of financial harm 
to any customers as a result of the attack, and the SEC noted that the firm 
retained a cybersecurity firm to review the incident, provided notice of the 
breach, and offered free identity monitoring to every affected individual.65 
Nevertheless, the SEC’s Co-Chief of its Enforcement Division’s Asset 
Management Unit stated that “as we see an increasing barrage of cyber attacks 
on financial firms, it is important to enforce the safeguards rule even in cases 
like this when there is no apparent financial harm to clients . . . [therefore] 
[f]irms must adopt written policies to protect their clients’ private information 
 
 59 Press Release, SEC, SEC: Morgan Stanley Failed to Safeguard Customer Data (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-112.html.  
 60 Id. 
 61 R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 2015 Lexis 
3909 (ALJ September 22, 2015) (cease-and-desist order). 
 62 Id. at 2. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 3. 
 65 Id. 
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and they need to anticipate potential cybersecurity events and have clear 
procedures in place rather than waiting to react once a breach occurs.”66 
Addressing similar concerns, on May 15, 2015 FINRA fined a firm 
$225,000 for allegedly failing to have written supervisory procedures that were 
reasonably designed to protect confidential customer and proprietary 
information in violation of Rule 30(a) of Reg. S-P, after an employee lost a 
laptop computer that contained unencrypted financial and personal information 
of customers.67 Specifically, FINRA alleged that the personal and confidential 
information of 352,551 customers was placed at risk when an Information 
Technology employee of the firm inadvertently left an unencrypted laptop in a 
restroom and it was lost.68 At the time the unencrypted laptop was lost, the 
firm’s written supervisory procedures provided for the adoption of Information 
Security Policy and Standards containing policies relative to data management, 
access controls, confidentiality and integrity, infrastructure, acceptable use, 
threat and vulnerability management and education and awareness; however, 
the firm’s Information Security Policy and Standards allegedly did not require 
encryption of laptop hard drives, and only belatedly required laptop 
encryption.69 While there were no allegations that the data was ever stolen or 
used, FINRA found that the information was put “at risk” and the firm’s 
written supervisory procedures were insufficient.70 
3. Books & Records Violations (SEA Section 17(a), Rule 17a-3, FINRA 
Rule 4511) 
On December 21, 2016, FINRA fined 12 firms a total of $14.4 million for 
alleged significant deficiencies relating to the preservation of broker-dealer and 
customer records in a format that prevents alteration.71 FINRA alleged that for 
prolonged periods, the firms failed to maintain electronic records in “write 
once, read many” (“WORM”) format, which prevents the alteration or 
 
 66 Press Release, SEC, SEC Chargers Investment Adviser With Failing to Adopt Proper Cybersecurity 
Policies and Procedures Prior to Breach (September 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
202.html.  
 67 Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., FINRA Letter of Acceptance Waiver and Consent No. 2014041619501 
(2015). 
 68 Id. at 2–3. 
 69 Id. at 2–3. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Press release, FINRA, FINRA Fines 12 Firms a Total of $14.4 Million for Failing to Protect 
Records From Alteration (December 21, 2016), https://www.finra.org/newsroom/2016/finra-fines-12-firms-
total-144-million-failing-protect-records-alteration.  
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destruction of records stored electronically.72 FINRA alleged that each of the 
12 firms had WORM deficiencies that affected millions, and in some cases, 
hundreds of millions, of records pivotal to the firms’ brokerage businesses, 
spanning multiple systems and categories of records.73 In announcing the 
settlements, FINRA’s Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement 
stated “[t]hese disciplinary actions are a result of FINRA’s focus on ensuring 
that firms maintain accurate, complete and adequately protected electronic 
records. Ensuring the integrity of these records is critical to the investor 
protection function because they are a primary means by which regulators 
examine for misconduct in the securities industry.”74 
In light of these actions, firms can expect a continued regulatory focus on 
these areas and should be prepared to regularly audit their policies and 
procedures in these areas to ensure compliance with the regulators’ concerns. 
V. DATA BREACH PREVENTION AND PREPARATION 
In the current digital age, it is not a question of whether an organization 
will experience a significant security incident, but when. Indeed, the likelihood 
of a company experiencing a significant event is almost certain—whether it is 
a service outage or a breach of personal identifying information.75 Although by 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 For the less initiated, “breach” is a term of art involving the unauthorized access, disclosure, or use of 
“personally identifiable information”—usually defined to mean first name and last name of a consumer plus 
information that if known to a malicious actor could result in identity theft. A breach is a type of a security 
incident, and all breaches are security incidents. Not all security incidents are breaches, however. The 
difference between the two is significant because a breach requires consumer notification unless it can be 
demonstrated that there is a low risk of harm to the consumer. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.48.010 et seq.; Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 44-7501; Ark. Code § 4-110-101 et seq.; Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29, 1798.80 et seq.; Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 6-1-716; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701b; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 12B-101et seq.; D.C. Code § 28-3851 et 
seq.; Fla. Stat. § 501.171; Ga. Code § 10-1-910 et seq.; H.R.S. § 487N-1 et seq.; Idaho Code § 28-51-104 et 
seq.; 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/5,530/10, 530/12, 530/15,530/20, 530/25; Ind. Code § 4-1-11 et seq.; § 24-4.9-1 
et seq.; Iowa Code § 715C.1-2; Kan. Stat. § 50-7a01 et seq.; KY Rev. Stat. §365.732; La. Rev. Stat. § 51:3071 
et seq.; 10 Me. Rev. Stat. § 1346 et seq.; Md. Code Com. Law § 14-3501 et seq.; Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 1et 
seq.; Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.63, 72 et seq.; Minn. Stat. § 325E.61; Miss. Code § 75-24-29; Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 407.1500; Mont. Code § 30-14-1701 et seq.; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-801et seq.; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.010 et 
seq.; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 359-C:19 et seq.; N.J. Stat. § 56:8-163; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 899-aa; N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 75-61, 75-65; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01et seq.; Ohio Rev. Code § 1349.19; 24 Okla. Stat. § 161 
et seq.; Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 646A.600,646A.602, 646A.604,646A.624, 646A.626; 73 Pa. Stat. § 2301 et seq.; 10 
L.P.R.A. St § 4051 et seq.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11- 49.2-1et seq.; will be repealed effective June 26, 2016 and 
replaced by § 11- 49.3-1, et seq.; S.C. Code § 39-1-90; Tenn. Code § 47-18-2107; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 
§§ 521.002, 521.053; Utah Code §§ 13-44-101, 13-44-202, 13-44-301; 9 V.S.A. §§ 2430, 2435; Va. Code 
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no means all-inclusive, the following are some tips to prevent and prepare for 
data breaches. 
A. Appropriately Identify Assets 
“[W]ithout a thorough understanding of the IT infrastructure . . . any future 
attempts to increase security may be, at best, ineffective or, at worst, 
detrimental to the basic business functions of the organization.”76 Thus, a 
company must identify what types of data it possesses, which employees have 
access to the data, and how employees access the data. Identifying the type of 
data is a critical step because certain types of data are subject to various 
regulations—possibly more than one—and those regulations usually require 
specific safeguards. It is also important to know who has access to data 
because a necessary requirement under most regimes is limiting access to data 
on a need-to-know basis, which in turn limits exposure.77 
B. Implement an Ongoing Risk Assessment Process 
An organization is not capable of warding off every single threat—
especially those that are unknown. And regulators understand this. What 
regulators require, however, is an ongoing process that works to identify, 
assess, and control risk. The greatest penalties are, and will be, levied against 
those companies that fail to assess and control risk.78 Accordingly, an ongoing 
risk assessment process is necessary. 
1. The Risk Assessment Process 
The assessment process gives a business the ability to identify and assess 
the risk to its assets, which, in turn, allows a business to focus its attention and 
 
§ 18.2-186.6 § 32.1-127.1:05; Wash. Rev. Code § 19.255.010 et seq.; W. VA. Code § 46A-2A-101et seq.; 
Wis. Stat. § 134.98; Wyo. Stat. § 40-12-501 et seq.; see also 45 CFR §§ 164.400–414; 70 Fed. Reg. 15736–
15754 (March 29, 2005).  
 76 Peter P. Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMATION AND DATA PROTECTION 79 (2012).  
 77 For example, the “minimum necessary” standard in HIPAA requires covered entities to take 
reasonable steps to limit the use or disclosure of protected health information. 45 CFR §§164.502(b), 
164.514(d).  
 78 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Student Lender Settles FTC Charges That It Failed to Safeguard 
Sensitive Consumer Information and Misrepresented Its Security Practices (March 4, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/03/student-lender-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-safeguard-
sensitive; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Resolutions Agreements and Civil Money 
Penalties, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/agreements/ (last visited April 
6, 2017) (various settlements for failure to assess or implement safeguards).  
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resources on threats representing the greatest total risk. There are multiple risk 
assessment methodologies, but this process generally involves the following: 
• Identifying all reasonably foreseeable internal and external 
threats to the information assets; 
• Assessing the likelihood that the threat will materialize; 
• Evaluating the potential damage that will result if the threat 
materializes; and 
• Assessing the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, and 
safeguards in place to guard against the threat.79 
Many consultants are available to assist with this process and should be 
considered. 
2. Take Action Based on the Assessment and Implement Safeguards 
After a company has identified its greatest total risk, it must then take 
action to mitigate that risk. This is done by implementing reasonable physical, 
technical, and administrative safeguards. An example of a physical safeguard 
is a lock on a door or filing cabinet, or security cameras. Technical safeguards 
refer to the technological measures to protect your information, such as 
encryption, two-factor authentication, passwords, and firewalls. And last but 
not least, there are administrative safeguards, which are the management 
measures that companies should put in place to ensure that employees are 
properly handling data. These safeguards include policies and procedures, 
training and enforcement protocols, and segregation of duties. 
It is important to emphasize that every company should have documented 
policies in procedures in place. Such policies and procedures create 
expectations regarding the use of data, and all employees should be routinely 
trained regarding the company’s specific policies and procedures to ensure a 
thorough understanding of those expectations. Often companies might have 
active procedures in place, but they are not well-documented. This is a 
problem because the procedures will likely not be consistently understood or 
followed. 
Once employees have been trained in a company’s policies and procedures, 
the company must then implement measures to ensure that employees are 
 
 79 Jill D. Rhodes & Vincent I. Polley, THE ABA CYBERSECURITY HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE FOR 
ATTORNEYS, LAW FIRMS, AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS 51 (2013).  
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complying with the policies. This includes a sanction policy for employees 
who violate established protocol. 
Periodic security reminders should also be sent to employees regarding 
their security obligations or known threats, such as phishing emails targeting 
employees. Sending periodic reminders, through email, greatly increases 
employee awareness of their security responsibilities and results in employees 
being more cautious. These measures also increase the chance that employees 
will report suspicious behavior and perhaps avoid some malicious attacks, like 
phishing.  
C. Destroy What You Don’t Need 
Another way to mitigate your company’s risk is to destroy data that is no 
longer needed for business purposes. This requires the implementation of an 
effective information governance program, which identities and deletes data 
that is no longer necessary. Such a program is critical for companies that 
quickly accumulate massive amounts of personally identifiable information.80 
The accumulation of unnecessary sensitive data only increases a company’s 
exposure should a breach occur. 
Information governance programs vary—they can be manual, automated, 
or both. Manual governance programs are not practical for companies with 
large amounts of data, however. Manual programs require that every employee 
be (1) assigned tailored responsibilities and (2) trained in their specific 
responsibilities. Additionally, this is an ongoing process, meaning that 
employees will be constantly doing this. Simply put, it is just too time 
consuming. Automated governance programs involve applications that analyze 
data and take action based on a company’s policies. Automatic deletion of read 
emails past a certain date is a common automated process. Advanced 
automated solutions now also employ artificial intelligence to analyze content 
and make retention decisions. Ultimately, a governance program must be 
tailored to fit—there is no one-size-fits-all solution. 
 
 80 As a practical matter, the more data that is accumulated and not deleted, the less likely it is that the 
data will be viewed, analyzed, used, or understood, which means the data will have very little value for your 
company.  
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D. Develop an Incident Response Program—And Routinely Test It. 
It is crucial that companies develop and test their incident response plans. 
Adequate response plans include, but are not limited to, the following 
characteristics: 
• Approval from the C-Suite—Approval and sponsorship from 
upper management is critical for success. 
• Appointment of Proper Personnel & Assignment of 
Responsibilities—In addition to the company’s privacy and 
security officer(s), the right employees need to be chosen to 
make up the response team and they need to have clearly 
designated roles. This allows the team to quickly assemble—
each with a clearly assigned role—to respond to the incident. 
• Establish Clear Internal and External Lines of 
Communication, including Escalation—Team members need 
to know who to contact both inside and outside the company. 
For internal communications, an appropriate chain of command 
needs to be established as not every incident rises to the level of 
requiring an “all-hands-on-deck” approach. Indeed, some trivial 
matters will simply need to only be documents. For external 
communications, companies should include in the policy the 
contact information for their insurance providers, outside 
forensics investigators, PR firms, and law enforcement 
personnel, if necessary. 
• Set Methodology and Approach—The appropriate 
methodology for investigating and responding to an incident 
needs to be set. This includes assessing what state and federal 
laws are at play, especially for determining whether an incident 
rises to the level of a reportable “breach.”81 
• Checklists—To ensure consistent treatment of incidents, it is 
preferable to develop checklists for investigation and 
remediation. This will create a road map for your company to 
both respond to an incident, as well as remediate an incident. 
Finally, it is important for an institution to routinely test its incident 
response plan. This should be done through routine tabletop exercises, which 
involve an institution’s team responding to scripted, announced—or 
unannounced—“incidents.” For example, a team may be told that ransomware 
has attacked their information system. The team will have to work through and 
appropriately respond to the incident as if it is actually happening. Tabletop 
exercises can be a valuable tool to assess a team’s readiness, as well as identify 
 
 81 See supra note 1.  
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gaps in an instituion’s plan and increase awareness throughout the 
organization. 
E. Consider Cyber Insurance 
Finally, to defray the costs associated with significant incidents and 
breaches, companies should consider purchasing cyber insurance. Cyber 
insurance covers common first-party claims (e.g., incident response/crisis 
management and identity theft response, cyber extortion, data asset recovery 
and restoration, and business interruption caused by cyber security events.) and 
third-party claims (e.g., claims from third-parties arising from a breach in 
network security or transmission malware or claims related to a company’s 
failure to properly handle or protect personal information). However, the 
exclusions in the policy can greatly affect the handling of a claim. Companies 
will also need to carefully consider limitations of liability and applicable 
retentions to ensure that they are appropriately covered should an incident 
occur. 
 
